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Book Review
ORIGINS OF PROTECTIVE LABOR LEGISLATION FOR WOMEN, 1905-1925
By Susan Lehrer. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987.
Pp. viii, 318. $44.50 cloth; $14.95 paper.
Reviewed by Reva Siegelt
The Supreme Court's decision in Muller v. Oregon I ratifying protec-
tive legislation for women has led a varied life. Initially viewed as a vic-
tory for labor, reflecting the emergence of social realism in constitutional
jurisprudence, by the 1970s Muller was attacked as an exemplar of sexist
and paternalistic reasoning, the regime of sex-based distinctions it sanc-
tioned challenged by women demanding formal equality at law.2 In the
1980s, as women have increasingly come to question the sufficiency of a
formal conception of equality, it is not surprising that Muller should
receive renewed attention. The case figured prominently in debates over
the equities of a sex-specific claim to employment leave for childbearing
purposesJ prompted by California Federal Savings & Loan Association v.
Guerra. 4 No longer a rallying point of women's advocacy, Muller now
stands at the heart of feminist controversy, invoked by feminists defend-
ing formalist principles of equality against feminist challenge, to drama-
tize the danger their breach entails. 5 Most recently commentary has
t Joining the law faculty at University of California, Berkeley in fall, 1988. B.A. 1978, M.Phil.
1982, J.D. 1986, Yale University.
I 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
2 Compare Frankfurter, Hours of Labor and Realism in Constitutional Law, 29 HARV. L. REV.
353,364-65 (1916) with J. BAER, THE CHAINS OF PROTECTION: THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO
WOMEN'S LABOR LEGISLATION 61-67 (1978).
3 See. e.g., Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and the Work-
place Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1118, 1129-30 (1986); Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some
Reflections on Culture, Courts, and Feminism, 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 175, 196 (1983); cf
Kay, Equality and Difference: The Case of Pregnancy, I BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. I, 16-17
(1985) (protective legislation).
4 107 S. Ct. 683 (1987). Two cases in fact played a role in precipitating the maternity leave
controversy: California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. 683, and Miller-Wohl
Co. v. Commissioner of Labor and Indus., 692 P.2d 1243 (Mont. 1984), vacated on appeal, 107
S. Ct. 919 (for further consideration in light of California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra,
107 S. Ct. 683), judgment reinstated, 44 Mont. 1718,744 P.2d 871 (1987).
5 See. e.g., Taub & Williams, Will Equality Require More Than Assimilation. Accommodation or
Separation From the Existing Social Structure?, 37 RUTGERS L. REV.!I CIV. RTS. DEVS. 825,
831-35 (1985); Taub, Book Review, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1686, 1691-92 (1980) (reviewing C.
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begun to focus on women's role in securing and defending the sex-based
legislation Muller sanctioned-the case now posing questions about the
politics of feminist advocacy itself.6
For those interested in a closer examination of the historical refer-
ents in this controversy, Origins of Protective Labor Legislation for
Women, 1905-192j1 offers an ambitious, although problematic, account
of the politics of the sex-based regulatory regime. Susan Lehrer is by no
means the first to examine this controversial chapter in welfare reform
and women's advocacy, but she is one of the first to scrutinize the record
in the wake of the contemporary feminist debate. 8 Drawing on a rich
array of sources, Lehrer examines the motives and attitudes of the
diverse parties who promoted and contested regulation of women's
employment in the opening decades of this century. She devotes particu-
lar attention to the acrimonious debate over the legislation that divided
the women's movement after passage of the nineteenth amendment. Her
principal object is to make political sense of the episode. Why did the
legislation appear, and whose interests did it serve?
The answers she supplies may well gratify those who see in Muller
the perennial dangers of sex-specific regulation, and the possibilities of
misguided feminist advocacy. Lehrer contends that protective legislation
worked to subordinate women's position in the market to their role in the
family, and thus to reinforce the forms of women's unwaged and
underwaged work. In both respects, Lehrer argues, the legislation served
the interests of the business classes, and was in fact enacted to achieve
this end. (pp. 227-29, 234-36)9 However, Lehrer's own evidence calls
into question the adequacy, as well as accuracy, of this account. Having
undertaken the ambitious task of analyzing advocacy of protective legis-
lation in light of the interests it served, Lehrer presents for us at a more
complex level the difficulties in coming to terms with this episode in his-
tory. If the questions her book raises are in important respects more
MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINA-
TION (1979».
6 See, e.g.. S. HEWLETT. A LESSER LIFE: THE MYTH OF WOMEN'S LIBERATION IN AMERICA
211-18 (1986); Olsen, From False Paternalism to False Equality: Judicial Assaults on Feminist
Community. Illinois. 1869-1895, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1518, 1520-21 (1986); cf Feminist Dis-
course, Moral Values. and the Law-A Conversation, 34 BUFFALO L. REV. II, 68 (1985)
(remarks of Ellen DuBois) (protective legislation); Krieger & Cooney, The Miller- Wohl Con-
troversy: Equal Treatment, Positive Action and the Meaning of Women 5 Equality, 13 GOLDEN
GATE V.L. REV. 513, 570-72 (1983) (protective legislation).
7 S. LEHRER, ORIGINS OF PROTECTIVE LABOR LEGISLATION FOR WOMEN, 1905-1925 (1987).
8 Nancy Colt and Frances Olsen have each recently produced significant studies of this episode,
which, though considerably shorter than Lehrer's, should be examined alongside it, as they
proceed from markedly divergent viewpoints. N. COTT, THE GROUNDING OF MODERN FEM-
INISM 117-42 (1987); Olsen, supra note 6. For a review of the literature in this area, see Basch,
The Emerging Legal History of Women in the United States: Property. Divorce, and the Consti-
tution, 12 SIGNS 97, 113-15 (1986); Shanley, Suffrage. Protective Legislation. and Married
Women's Property Laws in England. 12 SIGNS 62. 67-71 (1986).
9 All parenthetical page references are to S. LEHRER. supra note 7.
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compelling than the answers it provides, we are nonetheless benefited.
The critical significance of this moment of history may well lie in the
debates it provokes-not the lessons it supplies.
I.
Lehrer opens her story at the turn of the century, a period of consid-
erable upheaval in the workplace. As employers attempted to remove
production from the control of skilled labor and to maximize profit in an
intensely competitive market, growing numbers undertook to reorganize
the work process, turning both new industrial technology and the
precepts of scientific management to this end. (pp. 19-22) In Lehrer's
view, this industrial drama provided a stimulus to regulation in two
respects. First, employers attempting to reorganize the work process
redistributed tasks among men, women, and machines in a manner that
upset all natural distinctions between men's and women's work, illustrat-
ing the gendered basis of job definition and compensation in terms that
did not escape the attention of contemporary observers. (pp. 23-26, 30)
Second, middle-class reformers, while deeply troubled by the persistent
segregation and low wages characterizing women's employment, saw in
employers' use of scientific management the possibility of "scientific"
regulation to remedy labor's plight. (pp. 31-32) In this light Lehrer
examines Josephine Goldmark's pioneering study, Fatigue and Effi-
ciency, 1O in which Goldmark, who collaborated with Louis Brandeis on a
brief for the state in Muller v. Oregon, II set forth her case that "the need
for the short[er] workday rests upon a scientific basis."12 Because over-
work produced fatigued and inefficient workers, the simple facts of
human physiology could justify limiting a wage-earner's hours without
compromise of an employer's profit. (pp. 34-37)
Lehrer then doubles back to examine the legal context in which pro-
ponents of legislative. reform built their case for state intervention in the
workplace. From the outset, those interested in regulating the employ-
ment relationship encountered a judiciary disposed to defend it on consti-
tutional grounds of free contract. While legislative advocates succeeded
in persuading courts that regulation of men's employment was justified in
narrowly defined occupational circumstances, courts respo~ded to their
case for regulation of women's employment in qualitatively different
terms. As Lehrer makes clear, state courts in the years prior to Muller
did strike down protective legislation for women as abridging freedom of
contract; but where they upheld it, they focused on the peculiar charac-
10 J. GOLDMARK, FATIGUE AND EFFICIENCY (1912).
11 Brief for Defendant in Error, Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
12 S. LEHRER, supra note 7, at 35 (quoting J. GOLDMARK, supra note 10, at 38-39) (bracketed
material appears in primary source).
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teristics of female employees as a class--emphasizing differences in
women's legal status, physical structure, reproductive role, and familial
obligations. (pp, 56-58)13 Thus when Brandeis and Goldmark undertook
to defend an Oregon law setting maximum hours for women workers by
presenting the Supreme Court with empirical evidence demonstrating the
physiological effects of fatigue on women, the legal basis of their case was
already well established. "[W]omen's position as wives and mothers"
defined their position in law, justifying class-based limitations on their
employment. (p. 61) The culture supporting the prevailing family and
wage structure thus infused legal discourse, making distinctions between
male and female employment "reasonable." (pp. 56, 61)
If the great body of protective legislation directed at women fared
well in the courts in the years after Muller, Lehrer observes, minimum
wage legislation did not. After some years of uncertain reception, in
1923 the Court ruled in Adkins v. Children ~ Hospita[l4 that, notwith-
standing Muller's approval of maximum hours regulation for women, a
statute setting a minimum wage for women impermissibly infringed upon
their freedom of contract. Lehrer contends that neither the relative
intrusiveness of wage regulation, nor incipient feminist criticism of sex-
based legislation provides a sufficient explanation for the Court's differen-
tial treatment of women's wage and hours laws. Rather, she traces the
Court's response to the gender ideology on which the sex-based regula-
tory regime rested. Societal interest in the performance of women's
maternal and domestic responsibilities may have warranted limits on
their employment; it did not justify enhancing their wages. (pp. 93, 230-
32) Indeed, Lehrer argues, the premise that wage-earning women were
nonetheless economically dependent was so widely shared it informed
even the legislated wage scales in contention, as well as the documentary
studies of working women's poverty generated in their support. (pp. 89,
93)
For Lehrer, then, the Court's tolerance of protective legislation, as it
restricted the hours and times during which women might work but not
as it increased their wages, appears not only internally coherent, but
faithful to the logic of the protective regime as a whole. Premised on
assumptions of women's dependency, the legislation tended to reinforce,
13 In 1902, for example, a Nebraska court sustained maximum hours legislation for women
against constitutional challenge, emphasizing women's status "to a certain extent, [as) wards
of the state," and reasoning that women's "physical limitations" warranted regulation, as
overwork might "render them incapable of bearing their share of the burdens of the family
and the home." Wenham v. State, 65 Neb. 395,405,91 N.W. 421, 424-25 (1902), quoted in S.
LEHRER, supra note 7, at 57. In that same year, a Washington state court upheld an hours
law for women as a proper exercise of the police power, declaring it "Iogical[) ... that that
which would deleteriously affect any great number of women who are the mothers of suc-
ceeding generations must necessarily affect the public welfare and the public morals." State v.
Buchanan, 29 Wash. 603, 610, 70 P. 52, 54 (1902), quoted in S. LEHRER, supra note 7, at 58.
14 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
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rather than disrupt, women's secondary market pOSItIOn. (p. 93) The
critical issue thus becomes, "in whose interests these protective labor
laws were being passed, and how the different groups defined their inter-
ests over time." (pp. 58-59) Lehrer supplies an answer in two parts, first
analyzing the advocacy efforts of a diverse array of social groups over the
opening decades of this century, then analyzing the functional logic of
the regime itself.
Clearly the initial impetus for the legislation came from social
reformers, most from the middle class and many of them women. Key
support was provided by the National Consumers League (p. 185),15 and
especially, the Women's Trade Union League (WTUL), an association of
wage-earning women and middle-class "allies" that relied on both organ-
ization and legislation to improve women's laboring conditions. (pp. 115-
16, 125-28, 185) As Lehrer notes, until passage of the nineteenth amend-
ment in 1920, the suffrage movement counted adequate protective legisla-
tion for women and children among the principal benefits of obtaining
the vote. (pp. 99-100) Both citizen advocates and governmental commit-
tees across the country produced volumes of evidence documenting the
need for such legislation. (p. 185)
Not surprisingly, the legislation was vigorously opposed by employ-
ers in the manufacturing and retail sectors of the economy where large
numbers of women worked. (p. 186) However, as public acceptance of
the legislation grew, employer resistance assumed increasingly discrete
forms. For the most part, the business community remained united in its
opposition to the legislation throughout the period in question; what
changed, Lehrer contends, were the tactics used in contesting it. (pp. 203,
217, 223)
By contrast, Lehrer argues, the stance of organized labor was more
ambiguous. Firmly committed to organization rather than legislation as
a means of self-help, the male-dominated craft unions of the American
Federation of Labor (AFL) slowly came to support protective legislation
as appropriate for women, drawing the line at minimum wage laws. (pp.
144-45, 148-53) But where the AFL's national leadership offered only
tentative support of protective legislation during the pre-war period,
Lehrer suggests that member unions may have been far more actively
involved in promoting regulation at the local level: she documents the
role of the Iron Molders Union in obtaining New York legislation that
excluded women from the core room of foundries. (pp. 157-59) Organ-
ized labor became more visibly interested in the regulation of women's
employment only as the approach of World War I raised the prospect of
15 The National Consumers League lobbied for protective legislation, and organized consumer
boycotts as a strategy to improve the working conditions of women and children. Erickson,
Historical Background of "Protective" Labor Legislation: Muller v. Oregon, in 2 WOMEN AND
AMERtCAN LAW: THE SOCIAL HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 155, 158 (D. Weisberg ed. 1982).
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large numbers of women entering men's traditional jobs. (p. 151) At this
juncture, even the executive council of the AFL was moved to embrace
principles of equal pay-and to espouse concern that women not perform
tasks for which they were unsuited. (pp. 155-56)
If wartime upheaval in domestic labor markets prompted the AFL
to adopt a more favorable view of protective legislation, so, too, Lehrer
argues, did wartime experience transform at least some middle-class
advocates of the legislation into critics. After passage of the nineteenth
amendment, the militant suffragists of the National Women's Party
(NWP) cautiously began to voice criticism of the legislation-provoked
in part, Lehrer suggests, by the wholesale firing of women transit work-
ers at the war's end, an action which employers blamed on night-work
restrictions. What, these suffragists asked, was the effect of protective
legislation on women who had succeeded in entering men's jobs during
the war? (pp. 106-07) Open controversy broke out in the ranks of the
suffrage movement when in 1923 the NWP backed an equal rights
amendment, whose terms were understood to compromise protective leg-
islation for women. At this juncture, the NWP announced its opposition
in principle to all sex-based distinctions in law and denounced the central
premise on which the regulatory regime rested: that women's peculiar
weakness justified special protection. (pp. 108-09) With equal ferocity,
the NWP attacked the legislation as contrary to women's class interests,
insisting that men, not women, were the primary beneficiaries of its pro-
tection. (pp. 111-13)
. By contrast, Lehrer observes, the majority of those who fought for
suffrage remained adamant in their support for the legislation. Faced
with evidence of the legislation's exclusionary workings in the post-war
period, the League of Women Voters l6 and WTUL contended that the
legislation benefited the majority of working women, who remained
unorganized and burdened with family responsibilities. They derided
NWP's preoccupation with equal access as mere professional ambition,
neither pertinent to the life circumstances of most working women, nor
implicated by the regulations in issue. Indeed, they now embraced fam-
ily life as women's social and biological destiny. (pp. 102-05, 127-28)
Where for decades WTUL had proudly defended women's right and
capacity to enter all fields of employment, by the 1920s the organization
had despaired of organizing women without AFL assistance and turned
to legislation as the primary means. to secure workplace protection for a
weaker sex. (pp. 123-28) As Lehrer documents, WTUL's efforts were
vigorously opposed by a small group of women workers, most of them
printers, who formed the Equal Opportunity League to protest legislative
restrictions on women's employment (pp. 128-32, 162-68); however, she
16 The League of Women Voters served as organizational successor to the National American
Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA) after passage of the nineteenth amendment. (p. 99)
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identifies no other organized source of opposition to protective legislation
within the ranks of working-class women. To the contrary, Lehrer notes,
WTUL enjoyed the support of the International Ladies Garment Work-
ers' Union, and apparently was capable of drawing crowds of women
workers to public hearings in support of the legislation. (pp. 177-81)
Having analyzed the loci of support and opposition to protective
legislation over a span of several decades, Lehrer is not, however, ready
to answer the question of whose interests it served. Indeed, she flatly
rejects the neat equation of advocacy and interest a "pluralist" model of
political process might offer, seeking instead an answer in the systemic
logic of the protective regime itself. (pp. 12-13) The legislation, she
observes, did more than stereotype or discriminate against women:
"Protective labor legislation for women served to legitimate and rein-
force ... the chief role of women as unpaid workers in the home, while
also 'adjusting' their work force participation to prevent it from imping-
ing upon their primary function in capitalist society." (p. 229) From a
functional standpoint, then, the legislation worked to "preserv[e] the
basis for capitalist production." (p. 229) It is from this functional assess-
ment of the legislation that Lehrer derives a dynamic account of its his-
torical logic:
These laws developed as an attempt to mediate the contradiction
under capitalism, between the need to reproduce the labor force (which
takes place within the family and is based on the domestic labor of the wife
outside the labor force) and the desire of capital to use women's labor to
the limits of human endurance as cheap, relatively unskilled wage labor
(since the wage structure of women was based on the assumption that
women are not the primary breadwinner in a family). Capital both
depended upon the family for the maintenance and reproduction of its
labor force and also, in its exploitation of women workers in particular,
tended to destroy it. This is the significance of the social reformers' pleas
for the "preservation of the familY," despite their quaint, moralistic tone.
(pp. 227-28)
Lehrer's summary thesis, advanced in the concluding pages of the
book, retrospectively infuses the debate examined in the body of her
work with unsettling import. The history of advocacy there documented
now appears epiphenomenal, its "significance" to be explained by
recourse to the deep structure of capitalism, whose "need[s]" and "con-
tradi~tion[s]" account for enactment of protective legislation. This inter-
pretive strategy demands scrutiny, if only because it dramatically inverts
relations of advocacy and interest. Testing the coherence of Lehrer's
argument, internally and against her evidence, not only reveals troubling
deficiencies; it renders suspect any schematic formulation of the legisla-
tion's political logic.
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II.
At the outset, it can be observed, several aspects of Lehrer's method-
ology compromise the strength of her interpretive claims. Whatever its
political complexion, a functional analysis of a particular social institu-
tion cannot adequately account for the processes of its development.
Yet, it is from such a functionalist assessment of protective legislation
that Lehrer would derive a dynamic model of its life. In essence, Lehrer
is blinded by "the wisdom of hindsight." (p. 15) While purporting to
analyze the "origins" of protective legislation, her argument remains
focused on the form and function it ultimately assumed, conflating ques-
tions of cause and effect. In this overdetermined account of historical
process, the "interests" protective legislation came to serve playa more
prominent role in explaining its enactment than the actions, intentions,
and expectations of historical actors.
The problem is further compounded by the model of historical pro-
cess on which Lehrer relies. Quite plainly, any inquiry into the origins
and effects of protective labor legislation for women must explore con-
cerns of gender not readIly amenable to class-based analysis. Yet, Lehrer
never critically analyzes a class-based model of historical process in light
of its inattention to matters of gender. Rather she compensates for its
explanatory deficiencies by "borrowing" from feminism, combining
class- and gender-based accounts of historical process without undertak-
.ing to reconcile them. 17 Where tensions between them become acute,
Lehrer's allegiance to class-based paradigms prevails, inclining her to dis-
count the gendered character of the relations of advocacy and interest
she seeks to explain.
To sustain her argument that protective legislation developed in the
interests of the employers who most opposed it, Lehrer must explain
how, as a matter of history, this transpired. The agent of this paradoxi-
cal tum of events, Lehrer argues, was the state: "The state acts to pre-
serve the long-run interests of capitalists, even though it may run counter
to their immediate demands.... do[ing] for capitalists what they are
unable to do for themselves individually." (pp. IS, 225) Yet Lehrer
scarcely examines enactment of protective legislation from the vantage of
17 Where categories of class do not suffice to explain the character of social relations under capi-
talism, Lehrer invokes categories of gender. However, she makes little effort to integrate the
two systems of explanation. Thus, to account for the sexual organization of economic rela-
tions, Lehrer argues that capitalism built upon elements of a patriarchal social order antece-
dent to it (p. 230); at scarcely any point, however, does she modify the concept of "interest" to
take cognizance of gender as well as class. Having proceeded throughout on the assumption
"that the state is a capitalist state" (p. 15), Lehrer abruptly concedes, three pages prior to the
close of the book, that it is "also ... ·patriarchal.· " (p. 236) If Lehrer means to argue that the
gendered forms of social relations are merely artifacts of a prior patriarchal tradition now
wholly integrated into capitalism, this last concession is inexplicable. For if the state is "also
... 'patriarchal,''' gender relations have present social force within capitalism for which
Lehrer must account.
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state processes. Indeed, she identifies no active proponents of the legisla-
tion who sought reform in the interest of the business classes. 18 Instead,
the primary legislative advocates she does identify are a group of social
reformers who saw themselves as acting on behalf of working women. If
their advocacy does not supply the evidence of intention her argument
requires, Lehrer is content to emphasize its premises and effects. Recog-
nizing that proponents of legislation, both of the middle and working
class, sought to aid wage-earning women and in fact succeeded in "ame-
liorating some of the worst abuses of their working situation," (p. 228)
Lehrer observes that none, including WTUL, questioned the primacy of
women's family obligations, and therefore charges all with having
worked to reinforce women's secondary position in the market. (pp. 93,
139)
Having classed the majority of women as unwitting allies of capital,
Lehrer uneasily hedges the role of organized labor. (pp. 9-10, 236)19
Though she firmly judges the legislation to have operated in the interests
of capital, she does concede that it was "also in the interests of male
labor, at least as they saw it." (p. 236) Craft unions of the period tended
to adopt a "male-supremacist outlook": to wit, "male unionists and
employers put aside their differences and united over the need to 'protect'
women out of skilled trades," thereby protecting men's jobs and preserv-
ing women's domestic role. (p. 232) As she obliquely concedes, the
unions "showed little sense of class unity." (p. 232) But, if employers
and unionists came to see common benefit in a sex-based legislative
regime that could be used to secure women's familial and market status,
nothing in Lehrer's account suggests they grasped this possibility at the
outset. Analyzed from a contemporary rather than retrospective van-
tage, and situated in a world organized by gender as well as class,
women's advocacy. of protective legislation may have had other signifi-
cance, and even more sense, than Lehrer grants it.
18 Lehrer never points to any significant group of employers promoting the legislation in their
own interests. She does allude to "some employers [who] conceded that legislation ... might
work to their benefit." (p. 234) It remains unclear whether even these employers ("evidently a
small minority") acted to secure passage of the laws, were effective in this capacity, or merely
intended their concessions for public consumption. (pp. 234-35)
19 Lehrer is quite explicit in stating the basis of her reservations: .
Although male unionists often did their best to reinforce the subordinate position of-
women in the labor force through outright exclusion and "protective" legislation, and
defined women primarily in terms of their role in the family as wives and mothers,
male workers did not create the conditions under which women worked-that is, wage
labor. It is simplistic to blame the male worker for the oppression of women ... even
though he was often a wiJling participant in that oppression. (pp. 9-10)
This analysis begs the complicity of male unionists in the specific forms of women's "oppres-
sion" with which Lehrer is otherwise concerned: that is, women's unwaged and underwaged
labor. Other historians of protective labor legislation have accorded organized labor a consid-
erably greater role in promoting restrictive legislation. See, e.g., A. KESSLER-HARRIS, OUT
TO WORK: A HISTORY OF WAGE-EARNING WOMEN 201-05 (1982); Shanley, supra note 8, at
70-71.
HeinOnline -- 3 Berkeley Women’s L.J. 180 1987-1988
180 BERKELEY WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL
Lehrer's argument that protective legislation was enacted in the
interests of capital is pitched at the highest level of abstraction, and does
not square with the record of advocacy she has meticulously compiled.20
This tension between her argument and her evidence is most disconcert-
ing in its narrative effects. For the story that emerges from Origins of
Protective Labor Legislation for Women little resembles the familiar
struggle of capital and labor. What emerges instead is a struggle of
women against women, in which women serve as the primary agents of
their own victimization-feminist advocates and opponents of protective
legislation standing as proxies for the interests of capital and labor prop-
erly understood. While the struggle amongst women over protectiv~ leg-
islation is critical to any account of this historical episode, and Lehrer
has gathered much documentary evidence that can contribute to our
understanding of it, the narrative and critical frame in which she presents
it is fundamentally flawed.
Throughout her account Lehrer styles advocates of the legislation as
"social reformers" (pp. 93, 95, lIS, 228), while reserving the characteri-
zation "feminist" for the NWP alone. (pp. 75, 95, 139, 239) This persis-
tent scheme of characterization artificially divides the women's
movement, ignoring the fact that those who would fight over the legisla-
tion during the 1920s together fought for suffrage in the decades prior;21
indeed they did so on the unquestioned premise that such legislation was
a benefit the vote itself might secure. (p. 239f2 Broad-based support for
20 If Lehrer's evidence does not support the claim that protective legislation was enacted in the
interests of capital, neither does it support a distinct claim she might advance-namely, that
the legislation ultimately came to serve the interests of capital. Advancing such a claim would
require a different type of evidence than she has supplied. Rather than analyze the attitudes of
historical actors towards the legislation, she would have to analyze the actual implementation
of the legislative regime. This she barely does, a lapse all the more noteworthy in light of the
prominent role effects play in her argument as to causation.
21 For analysis of the controversy over protective legislation as a dispute within post-suffrage
feminism, see, e.g., O. BANKS, FACES OF FEMINISM 153-79 (1981); S. BECKER, THE ORIGINS
OF THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT: AMERICAN FEMINISM BETWEEN THE WARS 197-234
(1981); N. Corr, supra note 8, at 117-42; N. DYE, As EQUALS AND As SISTERS: FEMINISM,
THE LABOR MOVEMENT, AND THE WOMEN'S TRADE UNION LEAGUE OF NEW YORK 155-61
(1980); A. KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 19, at 205-11; W. O'NEILL, EVERYONE WAS BRAVE:
THE RISE AND FALL OF FEMINISM IN AMERICA 264-94 (1969). Lehrer, however, is not alone
in depicting the controversy in terms that pit "social reformers" against "feminists." See
Erickson, supra note 15; cf S. ROTHMAN, WOMAN'S PROPER PLACE: A HISTORY OF
CHANGING IDEALS AND PRACTICES, 1870 TO THE PRESENT 153-65 (1978).
22 Historians of feminism dispute the political significance of legislative advocacy within the suf-
frage movement. Some characterize suffragists' demand for protective legislation as reflecting
a turn from justice-based to expedient or ends-oriented arguments for the vote, and more
deeply, a turn from a natural rights tradition of feminism to one aligned with the cult of
domesticity. E.g.• B. BABCOCK, A. FREEDMAN, E. NORTON & S. Ross, SEX DISCRIMINA-
TION AND THE LAW: CAUSES AND REMEDIES 39-41 (1975) [hereinafter BABCOCK]; A.
KRADITOR, IDEAS OF THE WOMAN SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT, 1890-1920 at 43-74 (1965); S.
ROTHMAN, supra note 21, at 127-32; Feminist Discourse, Moral Values. and the Law--A Con-
versation, supra note 6, at 64-68 (remarks of Ellen DuBois). From this perspective, advocacy
of protective legislation represents a dilution of, or departure from, feminist principles incident
to broadening the basis and appeal of the suffrage movement. [d. However, from another
standpoint, the suffrage movement was limited by its predominantly middle-class membership
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protective legislation expressed a grasp, however imperfect, of common-
alities in economic and familial circumstances uniting women across
class lines. At the same time, it concealed substantial differences as to
how women's class interests might best be advanced: for some, legisla-
tive advocacy was a strategy of self-help whose object was to strengthen
woman's position in the market while for others its object was to improve
woman's position in the home?3
Manifestly, a strategy of class empowerment that both challenged
traditional roles and demanded enhanced valuation of them could elicit
broad-based support, but not sustain it. Thus, the bitter controversy that
erupted over protective legislation after passage of the nineteenth amend-
ment can be seen as one in which the meaning and future direction of
post-suffrage feminism was in issue.24 By characterizing this controversy
as feminist on one side only, Lehrer not only fails to explore the dilem-
mas of feminist advocacy as women have historically experienced them;
and preoccupations. From this perspective, suffragists' advocacy of protective legislation
appears less a fall from feminist principles, than part of an effort to articulate a feminist
agenda that transcended women's class differences. E.g., M. TAX, THE RISING OF THE
WOMEN: FEMINIST SOLIDARITY AND CLASS CONFLICT, 1880-1917 at 164-201 (1980);
Jacoby, The Women's Trade Union League and American Feminism, in CLASS, SEX, AND THE
WOMAN WORKER 203 (M. Cantor & B. Laurie eds. 1977); Olsen, supra note 6, at 1534. Of
course, adopting the latter perspective does not dictate a position on the wisdom or viability of
the legislative strategy. Compare N. DYE, supra note 21, at 159-61 with M. TAX, supra, at
200-01.
23 For some, the legislative agenda was consistent with and complementary to the object of
organizing women workers; others sought redress of women's exploitation in the workplace
primarily because such exploitation imperiled women's family role. Middle-class women
might advocate protective legislation as an issue of economic empowerment in which they
could make common cause with working-class women. Or they might see the familial dilem-
mas of wage-earning women as an issue whose redress required their own empowerment in the
public sphere (hence justifying, not only suffrage, but the new social science professions in
which they were engaged). Historians have explored the political motives driving the legisla-
tive strategy from these and similar perspectives. See, e.g.. N. COTT, supra note 8, at 117-20;
N. DYE, supra note 21, at 151-53; S. ROTHMAN, supra note 21, at 114, 119-32; Jacoby, supra
note 22, at 207-15.
24 While disputes over advocacy tactics dating from the suffrage campaign found expression in
the conflict over protective legislation, they in no simple sense produced it. See N. COTT,
supra note 8, at 122; W. O'NEIll, supra note 21, at 274-78,283-92; cf S. BECKER, supra note
21, at 199-200, 204. The more "militant" suffragists of the NWP contained within their ranks
former supporters ofWTUL and protective legislation. See N. COTT, supra note 8, at 120-22;
S. BECKER, supra note 21, at 199; N. DYE, supra note 21, at 156-57. Some who had been
active in the NWP, notably Florence Kelley, remained fiercely committed to the legislation in
the 19205. N. COTT, supra note 8, at 122-24; W. O'NEIll, supra note 21, at 275-76. Funda-
mentally, the conflict divided the suffrage movement as it exposed tensions within woman's
rights advocacy not confronted in the pre-suffrage era. Cf N. COTT, supra note 8, at 119-20.
Evaluating the significance of this conflict for post-suffrage feminism entails more than a
judgment about the practical merits of the legislative strategy. At issue is a judgment about
the nature of the feminist coalition conflict splintered: did suffragists' support for women's
hours and wage legislation reflect compromise or enrichment of feminist advocacy? See supra
note 22. Lehrer never engages this historiographical controversy. Nor does she even justify
her characterization of contestants in the debate over protective legislation in self-conscious
terms. Compare BABCOCK, supra note 22, at 40 ("Fundamentally ... [female social reform-
ers] were not feminists; their tirst and primary concern had never been an effort 10 change
women's position in society vis-a-vis men, and they had joined the suffrage movement not
because of the essential justice of granting women the vote, but because they believed that the
women's vote would help them enact the social reforms which were their essential concern.").
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she declines to recognize a host of concerns and strategies as feminist. 25
If this bias accounts for Lehrer's rather self-contradictory embrace of the
middle-class NWP over the cross-class alliance represented by WTUL
(p. 239),26 it explains as well her notable lack of curiosity about the via-
bility of the strategy proponents of the legislation adopted.
In the years before and after the turn of the century when protective
legislation for women was first enacted, women were systematically
excluded from male craft unions, occupationally segregated, and consist-
ently paid at rates well below men.27 Abundant evidence to this effect is
scattered throughout Lehrer's narrative, although obscured by her focus
on the politics of scientific management as an economic context for the
legislative initiative. In the face of this evidence, one might well con-
clude-as prior to the 1920s most women apparently did-that properly
designed legislation could improve women's working lot. In occupations
dominated by women working at substantially depressed wage rates, leg-
islation limiting hours might well have provided relief without sexually
exclusionary effect;28 however regulated, women's labor was likely to be
cheaper than men's.29 Similarly, minimum wage legislation posed little
threat to women's jobs where their wages, unregulated and regulated,
2S Precisely because Lehrer employs the term "feminist" without exploring the implicit histori-
ographical and philosophical assumptions of her usage, she narrates the controversy in terms
that obscure some of its more fascinating dimensions. What are the possibilities of forging a
cross-class alliance among women, and what are the attendant dilemmas? How can or must
feminism respond to differences in women's interests and circumstances-and to differing per-
ceptions among women of their common interests? Does a commitment to comparative equal-
ity alone define feminist vision? If not, what other values might inform a feminist conception
of equality? How might its pursuit conflict with feminist commitment to women's welfare, or
their culture? Finally, to what philosophical, political, and historiographical tensions within
feminism do these questions give rise? Lehrer's failure to engage such questions is especially
noteworthy in light of her historical and political interest in questions of class as well as
gender.
26 Lehrer places primary responsibility for exclusions under the legislation on the backs of its
proponents in the WTUL, in effect embracing NWP as a proxy for the interests of working-
class women properly understood. From an historical standpoint, she thus vilifies those
women most interested in synthesizing gender and class advocacy, displaying little sympathy
for the difficulties they encountered in pursuit of this goal-within the labor movement, the
suffrage movement, or even among the working-class women whose cause they sought to
advance.
27 See N. COTI, supra note 8, at 129-34; A. KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 19, at 151-71 (unioni-
zation); J. MATIHAEI, AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF WOMEN IN AMERICA: WOMEN'S WORK,
THE SEXUAL DIVISION OF LABOR, AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF CAPITALISM 187-232 (1982)
(sexual stratification of the workforce); L. TENTLER, WAGE-EARNING WOMEN: INDUSTRIAL
WORK AND FAMILY LIFE IN THE UNITED STATES, 1900-1930 at 13-25, 169-72 (1979)
(wages).
28 In this discussion I consider only those exclusionary effects specific to sex-based protective
legislation. Of course, both sex-based and sex-neutral hours and wage laws may, by increasing
the cost of labor to the employer, result in a net job loss to the working class; to the extent
such legislation sets industry standards, it may impede gains through bargaining; and finally,
collective standards may inhibit individual workers from pursuing what they conceive to be
their best interests in the market. These liabilities are common to all forms of protective labor
legislation, whose strategic wisdom I do not understand Lehrer to question.
29 This argument was in fact presented to the Muller Court by Brandeis and Goldmark. Brief
for Defendant in Error at 82-84, Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
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remained at levels below men's. While Lehrer emphasizes the defeat of
minimum wage legislation in Adkins v. Children's Hospital,3o proponents
of the legislation were in fact successful in enacting and defending wage
laws for women in a good number of states by the mid-lnOs. 3t
Of course, night-work laws and occupational restrictions, where
enforced, had immediate exclusionary impact. Moreover, as feminist
critics of the legislation recognized in the post-war period, even regula-
tion not explicitly exclusionary in form might acquire exclusionary effect
where applied to women in partially integrated work settings. But while
feminist critics came to condemn sex-specific legislation as exclusionary
per se, the historian requires some factual basis for evaluating this judg-
ment. If we are to assess the actual impact of protective legislation, and
further, to determine what responsibility its feminist proponents might
bear for its exclusionary effects, a complex array of questions arises.
What was the actual coverage of the maximum hours and minimum
wage legislation, when first enacted and in later decades? How prevalent
were night-work laws, and sex-specific occupational exclusions; when did
they appear, in what industries, and at whose urging? What was the
extent of women's occupational segregation over this period? What
forms of regulation exacerbated it; when did they do so, and how? What
were the politics of enforcement? Did the legislation cause or excuse sex-
based exclusions? What were its countervailing effects? How did women
fare in comparable, but unregulated, occupational circumstances?32
Unfortunately, Lehrer, who is interested in the politics of regulation
only at the most abstract level, never inquires into such prosaic matters.
She offers no account of the actual workings of the legislation across
states or over time, thereby preventing evaluation of the strengths and
30 261 U.s. 525 (1923).
31 By the mid-'20s, minimum wage laws had been enacted in Arizona, Arkansas, California,
Colorado, the. District of Columbia, Kansas, Massachusetts, Minnesota, North Dakota, Ore-
gon, Puerto Rico, Texas (repealed), Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin. Compulsory mini-
mum wage legislation had been upheld by courts in Arkansas, Minnesota, Oregon, Texas,.and
Washington. THE SUPREME COURT AND MINIMUM WAGE LEGISLATION at ix-x, 5 (National
Consumers League ed. 1925); ELIZABETH FAULKNER BAKER, PROTECTIVE LABOR LEGISLA-
TION 79-84 (1925), reprinted in 116 STUDIES IN HISTORY, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC LAW
(Faculty of Political Science of Columbia University ed. 1925). In fact, a decision of the Ore-
gon Supreme Court upholding the state's minimum wage laws was appealed to the U.S.
Supreme Court, where it was affirmed by an equally divided court. Stettler v. O'Hara, 69 Or.
519,139 P. 743 (1914), aff'd, 243 U.S. 629 (1917). This decision was generally construed as
legalizing wage regulation, as Justice Brandeis, who worked on the state's brief, did not par-
ticipate in the decision. J. BAER, supra note 2, at 92; THE SUPREME COURT AND MINIMUM
WAGE LEGISLATION, supra. at 3. The Adkins case was thus the first setback for minimum
wage regulation.
32 For one example of such analysis, see A. KESSLER.HARRIS, supra note 19, at 180-214. For a
general examination of women's wartime employment, see M. GREENWALD, WOMEN, WAR,
AND WORK: THE IMPACT OF WORLD WAR I ON WOMEN WORKERS IN THE UNITED STATES
(1980). While Lehrer focuses on the notorious role night-work restrictions played in the firing
of New York transit workers (p. 106), it should be noted that women transit workers in cities
without such legislation were similarly excluded; indeed, WTUL played a key role in defend-
ing their jobs. (pp. 132-33) See M. GREENWALD, supra, at 139-84.
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weaknesses of the legislative agenda social reformers advocated. Nor
does she attempt to discriminate among social reformers, legislators,
employers, and organized labor in allocating responsibility for the legisla-
tion's exclusionary effects. Thus, she never entertains the possibility that
women pursued a strategy that was flawed in part, or one that became
dysfunctional over time, much less the possibility that, with time, busi-
ness and labor might have learned to exploit that strategy to their own
ends. Instead, working from the vantage of "hindsight," Lehrer projects
the ultimate logic of the regulatory regime back in time, attributing to
"the state" a foresighted grasp of the long-run interests of capital, and to
those who attempted to use it a blind complicity. If feminist proponents
of protective legislation did not question the primacy of women's family
role and ultimately came fiercely to defend it, they were passionately
committed to redress of the real conflicts with which wage-earning
women daily contended. Both values informed their advocacy. For this
reason, if no other, the legislative strategy they pursued deserves more
respectful inquiry than Lehrer has accorded it. 33
Judged from a legal and political standpoint, there were, of course,
distinct risks to the sex-specific strategy legislative proponents pursued,
and considerable harm to women did in fact result. Indeed, Lehrer, who
i3
emphasizes the larger political dynamic of protective legislation, tends to
underestimate its specifically legal lineage and legacy. Where state legis-
latures had only recently conferred upon wives capacity to contract and
rights in earnings contrary to common law rules, courts' readiness to
exempt women from doctrines of free contract reflected something more
than "the prevailing custom and culture of the time." (p. 61) The com-
mon law itself viewed women's contracts in terms of their familial rela-
tions, a tradition courts now perpetuated in constitutional terms.34 From
a leg~l standpoint, then, NWP's contract-based objections to the legisla-
tion seem less conservative than Lehrer suggests (pp. 112, 164), and its
apprehensions about the wisdom of a sex-based legislative strategy more
acute than even she grants. While Lehrer repeatedly observes that judi-
cial ratification of labor protective legislation was not strictly sex-specific
33 Compare, e.g., N. COIT, supra !lote 8, at 134-42; Basch, supra note 8, at 113-15; Olsen, supra
note 6, at 1534-41; Krieger & Cooney, supra note 6, at 570-72.
34 Courts asked to rule upon the constitutionality of protective legislation for women adverted to
the contractual disabilities of wives at common law with frequency, often referring to such
disabilities as a matter of sexual rather than marital status. See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's
Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 553 (1923); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 418, 422 (1908); Ritchie v.
Wayman, 244 III. 509, 518, 91 N.E. 695, 696 (1910); Ritchie v. People, 155 III. 98, 113,40
N.E. 454, 458 (1895) (striking down legislation); Wenham v. State, 65 Neb. 395,405,91 N.W.
421,424-25 (1902); People v. Williams, 189 N.Y. 131, 136-37, 81 N.E. 778, 780 (1907) (strik-
ing down legislation); State v. Muller, 48 Or. 252, 257, 85 P. 855, 857 (1906), aff'd, 208 U.S.
412 (1908). Cf State v. Loomis, 115 Mo. 307, 313, 22 S.W. 350, 351 (1893) (voiding act
prescribing lawful means of wage payment) ("classification is reasonable and not arbitrary"
where it "concem[s] married women, minors, insane persons, bankers, common carriers and
the like ...."). I examine the relation of common law and constitutional traditions in a
forthcoming article on reform of marital status law.
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(pp. 56, 238), she ignores the fact that Muller v. Oregon 35 inaugurated a
constitutional regime of longevity and consequence exceeding even the
substantive due process principles of Lochner v. New York. 36 In a consti-
tutional tradition devoid of any competing conception of women's citi-
zenship, Muller's logic proved sufficient to justify any sex-based fonn of
state action, and in fact did so unchecked until 1971.37 Early feminist
critics of protective legislation thus proved farsighted in both their legal
and political critique of the regime, and, as Lehrer abundantly docu-
ments, turned a wickedly modern wit to the task of deconstructing its
pronatalist logic. (pp. 108-11)
Whether we are to embrace their feminism as our own, as Lehrer at
times seems to suggest (pp. 6, 239), presents yet another question. We
can and should debate the prescriptive agenda of the NWP, asking
whether---on grounds of principle, pragmatism, politics, and prudence-
a commitment to fonnal equality would have proved more effective in
redressing conditions of material inequality in their time, or might be so
in our own. But if we are to seek guidance in history, it will not do to
conflate such questions. Origins of Protective Labor Legislation for
Women presents its story as if readily assimilable to current debate (p. 6),
whereas the task of making sense of each moment in history seems a far
more complex one, requiring us to draw and debate discriminations, as
well as continuities and parallels.
Rather than equate the protective episode with the evils of any
departure from the principles of fonnal equality, we need to define its
historical import with more precision. Was the legislative strategy a
counterproductive one from the outset? In all its parts? What exactly
was its role in exacerbating women's occupational segregation? By what
criteria are we to evaluate its benefits and detriments to women as a
35 208 U.s. 412 (1908).
36 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
37 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), was the Supreme Court's first decision holding sex-based
classifications violative of the equal protection clause. For an analysis of Muller's constitu-
tional significance in preceding years, see J. BAER, supra note 2, at 107-24; Rhode, Justice.
Gender. and the Justices, in WOMEN, THE COURTS, AND EQUALITY 13, 16-18 (L. Crites & W.
Hepperle eds. 1987). The expansive logic of the opinion was readily grasped by courts of the
era-as, for example, in this opinion by Judge Learned Hand for the lI1inois Supreme Court,
issued just two years after Muller:
We have already pointed out that the physical structure and maternal functions of
women place them at such a disadvantage in the struggle for existence as to fonn a
substantial difference between the sexes, a difference which, in our judgment, is of such
a substantial character as to fonn a basis for legislation without making the legislation
subject to the objection that it was not a proper exercise of the police power. The
differences existing between the sexes has [sic} often formed the basis of classification
upon which to found legislation. It is this distinction, when used as a basis for legisla-
tion, which authorizes legislation exempting women from military and jury service and
from working upon the public highways or working in mines, and which permits men
to enjoy, alone, the elective franchise and to hold public office, and fixes their status as
the head of the family in exemption and homestead laws.
Ritchie v. Wayman, 244 111. at 523, 91 N.E. at 698 (upholding legislation fixing women's
employment at a maximum of ten hours a day). .
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class? The debate over such questions is only a prelude to another.
What differences in women's economic, legal, and political circumstances
distinguish this moment from our own? In what respects do legislative
and adjudicative strategies presently contemplated differ from those
adopted by women at the turn of the century? Finally, to what extent are
such differences negated by the risk of "capture"-the possibility that
the logic of a particular strategy may be subject to legal or political dis-
tortion? Debate of such matters should prove far more instructive than
any ready application of history's lessons.
Origins of Protective Labor Legislation for Women both advances
and impedes this project. Lehrer's ambitious analysis of advocacy and
interest clearly raises the stakes in grappling with this episode. At the
same time Lehrer obscures an aspect of the legislation's legacy that must
be reckoned with by any who would analyze its historical or contempo-
rary significance: the polarizing effects of dispute over protective legisla-
tion on feminism itself.
Debate over sex-specific legislation during the 1920s did not sort out
social reformers and feminists, so much as it drove those debating the
meaning of feminism to simplify its complex impulses in ways that ulti-
mately muted their transformative power. In retrospect, we can distin-
guish advocates and opponents of regulation rhetorically, by their
proclivity to speak the language of difference or similarity, and tactically,
by their advocacy of sex-specific or formal strategies. In so doing, how-
ever, we merely reproduce polarities the debate itself engendered, obscur-
ing the dilemmas of advocacy from which it issued. 38 Drawing on
diverse strands of a common, complex heritage, opponents of the legisla-
tion denounced sex-based regulation as an encumbrance on women's
potential lives, while proponents defended it as demanded by the circum-
stances of women's actual lives. Both values must inform any politics of
transformative aspiration, despite tensions to which they invariably give
38 To draw a contemporary parallel, those debating the maternity leave question are often fig-
ured as "equal treatment" and "special treatment" feminists. The characterization has elic-
ited protests from commentators on all sides of the question, who view it as oversimplifying
their respective positions. See. e.g., Olsen, supra note 6, at 1518 n.2; Williams, Equality's
Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.V. REV. L. &
Soc. CHANGE 325, 365 n.152, 380 n.224 (1985). Not only do these objections reveal common-
alities of concern; they suggest the controversy is as much a dispute over tactics, as principle
or philosophical commitment. Indeed, some have explicitly acknowledged as much. See Kay,
supra note 3, at 34.
In significant contrast to the circumstances of feminist debate in the 1920s, the present
dispute has not precluded critical dialogue among those in contention. See Law, Rethinking
Sex and the Constitution, 132 V. PA. L. REV. 955, 1002-13 (1984); Kay, supra note 3, at 32-37;
Olsen, supra note 6, at 1540-41; Taub & Williams, supra note 5. From this vantage, contro-
versy would appear to have vitalized feminist advocacy; it most threatens to undermine it
where conducted on the premise that a single contested issue can adequately "test" feminist
impulses, or a single position definitively comprehend them. If this observation has merit, it
would seem to bear equally on matters of historiography as well as contemporary politics and
jurisprudence.
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rise. Our object should be to recover the sympathies and circumstances
driving each of these voices within the tradition-without recapitulating,
in matters of history or politics, the conflicts that split them asunder.
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WOMEN'S WORK & CHICANO FAMILIES: CANNERY WORKERS OF THE
SANTA CLARA VALLEY By Patricia Zavella. Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1987. Pp. xviii, 191. $35.00 cloth; $10.95 paper.
Reviewed by Maria Blancot
Patricia Zavella's first book, Women's Work & Chicano Families,
provides an insightful and thought-provoking look at a topic that contin-
ues to hold great interest for feminists-women, work and the family.
Zavella revisits this subject with a long overdue study of Chicanas' par-
ticipation in the labor force and the Chicano family. The book focuses on
seasonal Chicana workers in the Santa Clara Valley canning industry and
analyzes the complex linkages between seasonal work, gender segrega-
tion in the workplace, and patriarchal family relations. Using an historic
and ethnographic approach, Zavella discusses the reasons why Chicanas
entered the seasonal canning labor force, conditions in the canneries, and
the impact of women's employment on families.
Women's Work & Chicano Families compresses volumes of feminist
scholarship and polemics on the causes of women's inferior position in
the labor market (sex-role socialization theory, analysis of who benefits
from women's labor, and patriarchal family ideology, to name only three
schools of thought). Zavella adopts socialist feminist analysis which
looks to the labor market for an explanation of why women are concen-
trated in particular occupations or industries-in this case canning.
Accordingly, she takes exception to the school of thought that posits cul-
tural values as the sole determinant of Chicanas' labor force participa-
tion. 1 She argues strongly, however, that an accurate account of the lives
of Chicana workers must incorporate race and cultural considerations
into socialist feminist theory. For Zavella this means understanding both
the role racism plays in employment opportunities, and the existence of a
family ideology specific to Chicanos. (pp. 5-6, 170)2 Zavella's study
t Staff Attorney, Equal Rights Advocates, San Francisco, California. A.B. 1981, University of
California, Berkeley; J.D. 1984, University of California, Berkeley.
I See P. ZAVELLA, WOMEN'S WORK & CHICANO FAMILIES: CANNERY WORKERS OF THE
SANTA CLARA VALLEY II (1987) for reference to studies employing this theory.
2 All parenthetical page references are to P. ZAVELLA, supra note I.
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incorporates social history and detailed, in-depth interviews to illustrate
her point.
The interviews reveal that Zavella's informants decided to enter the
seasonal cannery labor force due to a combination of two factors. First,
the local job market was such that for women with a limited education
and English-speaking ability, seasonal cannery work was the best option.
(pp. 90, 98) Second, seasonal employment was in a sense a compromise
because, despite a family's need for additional income, the woman's deci-
sion to work was often controversial. Many husbands resisted the idea,
and women were concerned that work would interfere with their obliga-
tions as mothers and homemakers. They viewed seasonal work four or
five months out of the year as temporary, permitting traditional family
roles to remain in place. (pp. 98, 137-148)
While seasonal employment alleviated tension and conflict at home,
it contributed to the segregation of Chicanas into oppressive and stressful
jobs. (pp. 71, 168) As seasonal workers, the women did not have suffi-
cient clout with the employers or the local Teamsters' union to insist on
decent working conditions. (p. 70) Zavella vividly describes the hazard-
ous and oppressive conditions of the cannery cookrooms and lines. (pp.
107-110)3 Furthermore, seasonal employment meant that women started
and remained in low-paying, dead-end jobs. Women who had worked
over ten seasons in a cannery returned to the same bottom-rung job year
after year. This situation originated with the industry's practice of divid-
ing work into men's and women's work. (pp. 30, 32, 69) It was institu-
tionalized by a union that, for years, negotiated contracts with separate
seniority lists for seasonal workers and year-round workers (mainly
white men in non-assembly line jobs). (pp. 54-62) The existence of two
lists made it vir:tually impossible for seasonal workers to get hired in full-
time jobs. (pp. 54-55)
Even after the seniority lists were finally merged in 1973, white men
dominated the high-paying jobs through two mechanisms. First, the
mostly white male y~ar-round workers were grandfathered into the top
of the merged list. Second, the canneries used an informal "incumbency
rule." Under this rule, workers who spent more than half of their time in
high-paying seasonal jobs had first choice in retaining those jobs the fol-
lowing season, regardless of seniority. White males were often hired tem-
porarily for high-paying positions and then became incumbents in those
positions which led to full-time jobs. (pp. 55-56) As a result of these
practices the canneries contained two distinct labor forces. Men, espe-
3 In 1976 the food and kindred-products industry had the second highest rate of work-related
injuries in California, after the lumber-manufacturing industry. P. ZAVELLA, supra note I, at
108 (citing DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES AND ILL-
NESSES SURVEY, CALIFORNIA, 1976 at 7 (State of California, Division of Labor Statistics and
Research 1978).
HeinOnline -- 3 Berkeley Women’s L.J. 190 1987-1988
190 BERKELEY WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL
cially white men, held the year-round, skilled or supervisory positions.
Women, especially Chicanas, filled the lower-level seasonal jobs. (p. 59)
In the late 1960s, Chicano men and women (sometimes along with
other workers) in San Jose, Hayward,4 Modesto and Sacramento formed
highly active rank and file dissident caucuses to represent them where the
Teamsters' locals had not done so. (pp. 62-63) In 1973, as an outgrowth
of the caucuses, male and female cannery workers, primarily Chicanos,
filed a Title VII race and sex discrimination suit, Alaniz v. California
Processors, Inc., 5 to eradicate the separate work forces. (p. 64) Defen-
dants in the case included: cannery companies throughout Northern
California, unions which represent their employees, including the Team-
sters' Union, and industry-wide collective bargaining agents for the com-
panies and the unions. 6 The plaintiffs alleged that wages and promotions
were issued in a discriminatory manner that favored white males. The
court agreed, and in 1976 ordered implementation of a Conciliation
Agreement which included an affirmative action plan that called for pref-
erential hiring and training programs, and the promotion of women into
30% of the high-paying jobs, as well as the dismantling of the
grandfathered seniority list, the elimination of the "incumbency rule,"?
and the establishment of plant seniority based on date of hire regardless
of seasonal or regular job.8 (pp. 64-65)
While Zavella may be right when she argues that women contrib-
uted to their own segregation by choosing seasonal occupations (pp. 98,
168), she fails to elaborate upon a crucial change in consciousness: once
employed, women organized against the segregation and fought for
upward mobility in the workplace. Although some of Zavella's infor-
mants did not take advantage of the promotional opportunities that had
been opened up by the litigation and organizing (pp. 120-26), women had
been involved in working to make sure the options existed. Clearly they
had begun to identify as workers as well as mothers and homemakers,
and they ceased to see their seasonal jobs as a temporary phenomenon.
Did this egalitarian spirit take hold in the home? What effect did the
women's employment have on the Chicano families interviewed in this
book? Zavella concludes that although the working women had more
say in family matters, including how money was spent, family roles did
not undergo a fundamental transformation. The household division of
labor shifted somewhat when the women were working. However, hus-
4 The Hayward Caucus, founded by women. was originally organized by Chicanas "who had
invited Black and white women to join them.". (p. 63)
5 73 F.R.D. 269 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
6 [d. at 272-73.
7 Alaniz, 73 F.R.D. 269.
8 Alaniz v. California Processors, Inc., 73 F.R.D. 289 (N.D. Cal. 1976) aff'd on other grounds
per curiam sub nom. Alaniz v. Tillie Lewis Foods, 572 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied
sub nom. Beaver v. Alaniz, 439 U.S. 837 (1978).
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bands, children and the women themselves continued to view housework
as the women's responsibility. Zavella attributes the lack offundamental
transformation to rigid, segregated seasonal jobs that kept women eco-
nomically dependent on their husbands. (pp. 169-170) She notes, how-
ever, that her informants who moved into higher-paying jobs were better
able to effect changes at home. (p. 170) While this economic argument is
attractive, discussion of some comparative studies on full-time Chicana
workers and their leverage (or lack thereof) in the home would have
been helpful toward an understanding of the large role ideology plays in
maintaining patriarchal family norms. 9
Women's Work & Chicano Families is instructive for activists and
attorneys working to understand and eliminate the causes of occupa-
tional gender segregation in seasonal as well as nonseasonal employment.
Although the cannery industry has declined dramatically since the late
seventies, many Chicana women continue to work in other low-paying
seasonal/cyclical jobs. 10 Zavella's study demonstrates that women work
in these jobs because of limited job opportunities due to skills, schooling
and language, as well as concern over quality childcare for their children
and home responsibilities. (pp. 88-98) It reminds us that low-cost, qual-
ity childcare would go a long way in allowing more women to work
outside the home in better-paying, full-time jobs with promotional oppor-
tunities. Furthermore, the battle for equality in the family is essential to
the economic empowerment of women. Many women will continue to
work in seasonal, marginal jobs as long as traditional patriarchal notions
of family roles predominate.
In addition, Title VII litigation similar to that filed by the cannery
plaintiffs11 provides a strategy for changing the marginal nature of cycli-
cal work. Alaniz v. California Processors, Inc. 12 demonstrates that courts
are willing to find that differential treatment of seasQnal and year-round
workers can constitute sex and race discrimination. Women who return
yearly to the same seasonal job should enjoy terms and conditions of
employment equal to those of year-round workers, particularly with
regard to seniority and promotional opportunities. They must have the
option of moving into full-time employment and better-paying positions.
The Alaniz-type litigation described by Zavella also serves as a strat-
egy for moving women into higher-paying non-traditional jobs. Some
sex-discrimination lawsuits do this by opening up entire industries and
workplaces that are male-dominated (e.g., skilled trades, police and fire
departments). Here, the women moved into the nontraditional occupa-
9 Zavella refers to other studies of Chicana workers throughout the book. However, she does
not discuss any in detail.
10 Segura, Labor Stratification: the Chicana Experience 29 BERKELEY ]OVRNAL OF SOCIOLOGY
60 (1984).
11 Alaniz v. California Processors, Inc., 73 F.R.D. 269 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
12Id.
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tions within the same company where they once held low-paying
women's jobs. It is a fair guess that many of the Chicanas that trained
for, and accepted, year-round warehouse, supervisory and mechanics
jobs as a result of the consent decree would not have considered seeking
that type of work outside of the canneries. If this is true, then litigation
like Alaniz might be a more effective means of moving into nontraditional
jobs women who are reticent about applying for such jobs.
